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ABSTRACT 
Under the final RFS1 legislation of 2007, Renewable Identification 
Numbers (RINs) were introduced as the mechanism for tracking compliance 
with United States government mandated volumes of renewable fuel 
blending in a given year.  Every RIN has a unique code which corresponds to 
a gallon of renewable fuel and can be traded as a credit. Along with the RIN 
credit system, the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) simultaneously built a 
detailed exchange framework where industry stakeholders mitigate risks and 
capture possible economic opportunities associated with biofuel market 
dynamics. This study aims to provide basic tools for navigating the RIN 
marketplace through analyzing supply and demand fundamentals and 
exploring the underlying fuel blending economics that influence RIN prices.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Due to the persistence of favorable fuel blending economics for corn-
based ethanol, Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) received minimal 
attention for years following their introduction by the Renewable Fuel 
Standard (RFS). Although these favorable blending economics still exist in 
2013, a combination of factors including tremendous price action has 
brought RIN markets to the forefront of the United States biofuel policy 
debate and captured the interest of various observers aiming to capitalize on 
potential trading opportunities.  
The RIN market remains puzzling due its relatively young age and 
opaqueness. RINs do not trade on a traditional exchange and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not restrict market 
participation, which helps create a unique, nearly “free market” atmosphere 
where price movements can be extremely volatile. This has been most 
evident in the early months of 2013 where D6 Current Year RINs increased 
from approximately $0.07 on January 2nd to greater than $1.05 on March 
11th. That equates to a 1500 percent increase in price over just three 
months and was mainly driven by concerns over separated RIN supply for 
use towards RFS compliance. Market shifts of this magnitude represent 
massive risk and opportunity to all that are involved in the trading of RINs.  
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When RIN prices exhibit large amounts of volatility as seen during 
early 2013, it becomes increasingly important to thoroughly understand the 
factors that could be impacting the market. Supported by theoretical supply 
and demand models, this study implements multiple regressions to 
demonstrate that there are a core set of relationships which drive RIN prices 
and are rooted in basic fuel blending economics. 
RINs can be viewed as financial options because they give the owner 
the choice to retire the RIN for RFS compliance or hold it for future use. 
Similarly to an option contract a RIN expires at some point and becomes 
worthless. With the assumption that RINs have a time and intrinsic value 
component, it is hypothesized that the intrinsic value is dictated by specific 
fuel blending margins and the strength of this relationship is reliant on 
whether the RFS mandate is binding or non-binding.  
Motivation 
Fundamentally, RINs allow firms to trade electronic or paper credits in 
the place of blending biofuel. RIN prices can therefore be viewed as the 
market rate for obligated parties to comply with the Renewable Fuel 
Standard (Thompson, Meyer, & Westhoff, Renewable Identification Number 
Markets: Draft Baseline Table, 2009). Firms that have the resources to 
inexpensively acquire and blend biofuel would prefer to physically blend on 
their own and even sell excess RINs, while firms who find it relatively 
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expensive to physically blend may opt to instead purchase a RIN. If an 
obligated party is to decide whether or not to blend renewable fuel, the 
latest RIN price is important because that represents the cost of the only 
alternative other than facing significant fines from the EPA. RINs are a 
relatively unexplored market and better characterizing the factors that 
influence prices should provide a more complete foundation for forecasting, 
risk management and trading. 
This analysis also presents a detailed history of price behavior across 
RIN categories over the past several years. RIN data tends to be private and 
in some cases difficult to access, which limits the amount of related 
literature. Given the unprecedented volatility that appeared in 2013 this 
project takes a holistic approach at understanding the underlying economics 
behind RINs in an attempt to improve market awareness. 
Another contribution is the breadth of the study, which is the first to 
observe all RIN categories individually and as well as investigating 
relationships between different RINs.  
Structure of the Work 
The first area to be discussed is the Renewable Fuel Standard. The RFS 
is central to understanding RIN markets because it is the mechanism that 
both created and regulates the credits. The most relevant parts of the RFS 
that will be highlighted are categories of renewable fuel, renewable fuel 
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volume mandates, and obligated parties. These sections mainly establish 
RIN classifications, the parties that must use them, and the size of the RIN 
market. 
Following the RFS will be a detailed look at RINs from a regulatory 
standpoint. There are many characteristics that make RINs unique and must 
be understood to better explain price behavior. These items will describe the 
lifespan of a RIN, the RIN supply chain, types of RINs that may be available 
and the penalties involved for violations. 
With the RFS and RINs examined, the next area of focus is current 
literature and theoretical work. These supply and demand models form the 
basis for the analytical methods in the subsequent section. 
After outlining the data and methods to be implemented, regressions 
are applied for each RIN category to investigate the potential relationship 
between RIN prices and underlying fuel blending economics. 
Lastly, results are reported and interpreted followed by a discussion of 
the study and notable observations for future work in this field. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
Renewable Fuel Standard 
Responding to dependency on foreign fossil fuel resources and 
mounting concern over the global environment, the United States 
government enacted multiple laws in the past decade with the goal of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) and promoting the use of 
renewable fuels (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010).  Authorized by 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the EPA initially created the Renewable Fuel 
Standard, which required the use of 4 billion gallons of renewable fuel in 
2006, progressively growing to 7.5 billion gallons in 2012. After being in 
place for approximately two years, this legislation was amended shortly 
thereafter. The new version was named the RFS2 and introduced drastically 
higher mandate levels, separate but nested categories of renewable fuels, 
and minimum performance standards for biofuels to qualify (Schnepf & 
Yacobucci, 2013). The RFS2 was officially put into effect in July 2010. 
At the core of the RFS2 are the actual volume mandates, but it is first 
essential to acknowledge the four major categories of biofuels presented in 
the legislation: renewable fuel, advanced biofuel, cellulosic biofuel, and 
biomass-based diesel (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). Each can be 
described as follows: 
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o Renewable fuel is directed mainly toward ethanol derived from corn 
starch and must meet a 20 percent lifecycle GHG reduction threshold.   
o Advanced biofuel is recognized as any fuel other than ethanol derived 
from corn starch, which also reduces lifecycle GHG emissions by 50 
percent or more. Imported Brazilian sugarcane ethanol as well as 
biomass-based diesel and cellulosic biofuel qualify as advanced 
biofuels.  
o Cellulosic biofuel must achieve GHG reductions of a least 60 percent 
compared to gasoline or diesel it replaces and includes renewable fuel 
produced from cellulose, hemicellulose, or lignin. Two examples of 
cellulosic biofuel would be cellulosic ethanol or biomass-to-liquid (BTL) 
diesel.  
o Biomass-based diesel (biodiesel) must meet a 50 percent GHG lifecycle 
reduction threshold and is usually referred to as biodiesel. For RFS 
purposes, biodiesel is diesel derived from fats and oils but cannot be 
processed alongside petroleum.  
Using these four categories, the EPA assigns a specific mandate level 
across each biofuel type. Expanding on the nested nature of the categories, 
higher GHG reduction items can count for lower GHG reduction items if the 
mandated level for a given year has been met in the higher GHG reduction 
category but not the lower (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010).  This 
means a varying assortment of the four types of biofuels can come together 
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to meet a year’s mandate based on production economics. Annual standards 
have been set by the RFS2, but each November the EPA can revise the 
numbers for the next year upward or downward.  Adjustments are 
determined after the EPA estimates the total volume of transportation that 
will be used in the upcoming year and then requires a percentage of that 
overall volume to be renewable fuel (Schnepf & Yacobucci, 2013). These 
changes can be drastic depending on restrictive market features such as 
production capacity. 
Figure 1 – Annual RFS2 Renewable Fuel Volume Requirements. 
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Table 1 – Annual RFS2 Renewable Fuel Volume Requirements (billion 
gallons). 
Year Cellulosic Biomass-based 
Diesel 
Advanced  Total 
Renewable 
Fuel 
2008 0 0 0 9 
2009 0 0 0.6 11.1 
2010 0.005* 1.15 0.95 12.95 
2011 0.0066* 0.8 1.35 13.95 
2012 0* 1 2 15.2 
2013 0.006* 1.28 2.75 16.55 
2014 1.75 a 3.75 18.15 
2015 3 a 5.5 20.5 
2016 4.25 a 7.25 22.25 
2017 5.5 a 9 24 
2018 7 a 11 26 
2019 8.5 a 13 28 
2020 10.5 a 15 30 
2021 13.5 a 18 33 
2022 16 b 21 36 
Source: EPA 
 
*Adjusted by the EPA from original RFS2 mandate values1  
a. To be determined, but greater than 1 billion gallons 
b. To be determined 
In addition to setting the volumes for each renewable fuel category, 
the EPA is also tasked with enforcement of the RFS2. Liable parties who 
                                                          
1
 The initial RFS for cellulosic biofuels for 2012 was 500 million gallons. In December 2011 
EPA revised this mandate downward to 10.45 million ethanol-equivalent gallons. In January 
2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for D.C. vacated EPA’s initial cellulosic mandate for 2012 
and remanded EPA to replace it with a revised mandate. On February 28, 2013, EPA 
dropped the 2012 RFS for cellulosic biofuels to zero (Schnepf & Yacobucci, 2013). 
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must comply with the mandate are made up of fuel blenders and exporters. 
Following the nationwide volume standards, the firms who supply gasoline or 
diesel motor fuel to the retail market must include a certain amount of 
renewable fuel in their product sold. This amount, known as the renewable 
volume obligation (RVO), is relative to the total transportation fuel that the 
firm sells in a given year, with higher expected renewable volumes from 
companies with more motor fuel revenue. The EPA releases a spreadsheet 
list of known obligated parties which contains close to seven thousand 
entities. Of these seven thousand entities, only about a third of them are 
unique2. Each obligated party is sorted based on their business activities. By 
far, the largest group of obligated parties is made up of non-renewable fuel 
importers at over 43.9 percent of the total. 
A key feature of a firm’s RVO is the equivalence values provision in the 
RFS. Equivalence values allow firms to claim 1 gallon of renewable fuel 
toward the mandate for corn-based ethanol, but 1.5 gallons for biodiesel 
when applied toward either the advanced or total renewable biofuel 
requirement (Environmental Protection Agency, 2010). The equivalency 
values were implemented to account for higher energy content and are 
meant to balance compliance incentives among the fuel categories.  
                                                          
2
 For example, Exxon Mobil Corporation appears forty-four times in the list, but only counts 
as one unique entity. 
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Obligated parties are penalized with significant fines should they fail to 
comply with the RVO. Any firm which is found to violate its annual mandate 
is subject to civil penalties reaching up to $32,500 per day, in addition to 
any economic benefit or savings resulting from the violation3 (Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2010). When it comes to tracking and accounting for a 
company’s RVO compliance, Renewable Identification Numbers enter the 
picture.  
Basics of Renewable Identification Numbers 
Each time a gallon of qualifying biofuel is produced or imported into 
the United States, a unique 38-character number called a RIN is generated. 
The code will appear as such: 
KYYYYCCCCFFFFFBBBBBRRDSSSSSSSSEEEEEEEE 
Each character in the code is defined below. 
K = Distinguishes RINs still assigned from RINs already detached 
YYYY = Year produced or imported 
CCCC = Company ID 
FFFFF = Plant or facility ID 
BBBBB = Batch number 
RR = Equivalence value  
D = Renewable fuel category 
                                                          
3 There is no formal methodology reported which defines how the economic benefits or 
savings from violating the firm’s RVO can be assessed. 
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SSSSSSSS = the start number for this batch of biofuel  
EEEEEEEE= the end number for the batch of biofuel 
The seventh term, known as the renewable fuel category can be 
related back to the previous section on the RFS.  Table 2 shows how each 
identifier differentiates major RIN types. 
Table 2 – D Code Identification. 
D Number RFS2 Mandate Category 
3 Cellulosic biofuel 
4 Biomass-based diesel 
5 Advanced biofuel 
6 Renewable Fuel 
7 Cellulosic diesel 
 
In succeeding sections these identifiers will be used to discuss specific 
RINs. For example, a D6 RIN should be interpreted as a RIN that can only be 
used to comply with the renewable fuel part of the mandate. Likewise, D4 
RINs represent biodiesel RINs and due to the nesting provision, can meet 
the renewable fuel, biomass-based diesel or the advanced biofuel mandate 
requirements. Application possibilities for RINs are presented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 – RIN Nesting Applications for RFS2 Mandate Compliance. 
 
 This dynamic creates a clear hierarchy for RIN prices. RINs for sub-
mandates must be equal to or greater in price than the broader categories 
because of the inherent optionality of higher GHG reduction RINs 
(Thompson, Meyer, & Westhoff, Renewable Identification Numbers are the 
Tracking Instrument and Bellweather of U.S. Biofuel Mandates, 2009). 
Although RIN creation is straightforward, the RIN lifecycle can be 
multifaceted and may be better understood through Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 – RINs from Generation to Retirement (From Paulson, 
2012). 
 
As previously noted, the RIN lifecycle starts when a gallon of biofuel 
has been produced by a biofuel plant or imported to the Contiguous United 
States. The batch has a code assigned and the RINs can then move on 
through the supply chain to an obligated party. If a RIN is not separated it 
cannot move independent of the gallon of fuel that it is grouped with4. RINs 
are assigned and linked when the gallon of biofuel is produced, but are still 
untradeable until rather late in the supply chain. Once the biofuel has been 
blended with motor fuel, it becomes separated. At this point three notable 
actions can be taken by the owner of the RIN. It can be applied to this year 
or last year’s mandate, stored, or sold to any registered trader. RINs can be 
                                                          
4
 RINs that are still assigned have the first digit in the RIN code as “1”, while separated RINs 
would have a “2”. 
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traded any number of times, but do expire two years after generation.  The 
fact that a RIN can be applied to the current or previous year’s mandate and 
also has a two year lifespan has interesting implications for stocks.  There is 
a process known as refreshing RINs in which a RIN owner retires older dated 
RINs while stocking the newest, in essence replenishing the RINs held. 
Depending on the strength of demand for a RIN in a given year, very large 
stockpiles could be possible. This will be investigated further when observing 
the EPA Moderated Transaction System (EMTS).  
Figure 4 exhibits the timeframe over which a RIN can be applied to a 
mandate. The calendar month in which the RIN was produced is also 
important when determining the lifespan of a certain RIN (Paulson, 2012).  
For example, if the obligation period started in January, a RIN generated 
that month would have close to a year more of eligibility than a RIN from 
December.  
Figure 4 – RIN Lifespan (From Paulson, 2012). 
 
RINs can be applied across a spectrum of mandate years, but expiry 
always relates back to when the RIN was generated via biofuel production or 
importation. A RIN generated in year t can be applied to last year’s 
t t+1 t+2t-1
RINt
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mandate, this year’s mandate, next year’s mandate, or even the beginning 
of the compliance term two years out from its original creation. This small 
window of eligibility at year t+2 exists because compliance for any year 
spills into the first few months of the next (Paulson, 2012).  Relating this 
timeline back to RIN price hierarchies, a previous year RIN should always 
cost less than a current year RIN of the same type because it possesses less 
time value. 
Increasing the complexity, obligated parties are permitted to bank or 
borrow up to 20 percent against the current year’s mandate. This gives a 
firm the opportunity to delay 20 percent of the current year’s RFS liability 
with the requirement of fulfilling it in the next year. Due to this provision, it 
is possible that over the course of a year, much more RINs could be 
generated than gallons of biofuel actually blended. When discussing 
accumulation of RIN stocks, the EMTS is a central piece. 
EPA Moderated Transaction System 
The EMTS was built by the EPA to provide a framework for the 
generation and transfer of RINs amongst all RIN owners mainly consisting of 
renewable fuel producers, importers, exporters and obligated parties. Non-
obligated parties may also utilize the system if registered with the EPA to 
trade RINs.  Registration simply requires contact information from the firm, 
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some other supplementary details about business activities, and an 
approximately thirty day waiting period. 
 
The EMTS can be accessed through an online website and has many 
features. With this interface a firm can buy or sell RINs, view current and 
historical RIN inventory, and generate, separate or retire RINs. When 
looking to buy or sell RINs, firms can use an embedded EMTS search 
function to filter potential trade partners. Pending trades can be viewed and 
cancelled within ten days of the transaction. After a trade is accepted, it is 
then reflected within the firm’s RIN Holdings section. Due to concerns over 
RIN authenticity, the system even allows organizations to block other trading 
partners or facilities. 
If a firm wishes to buy RINs, one common method is to wait until a sell 
transaction is sent with the specifications for quantity of RINs, batch volume, 
fuel code, assignment code, and the year the fuel was produced. The EMTS 
matches the specifications with pending sales of the trading partner and 
completes the deal. Buying transactions are queued until the seller has 
submitted a matching trade. After ten days, if no matching sale has been 
sent, the requested trade expires (Environmental Protection Agency, 2013). 
By monitoring all aspects of the RIN trading process, the EPA has the 
ability to track and report substantial amounts of RIN data. Figures 5, 6, 7 
and 8 are included to give a better understanding of the pace at which RINs 
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are generated as well as the quantities of RINs that are available or retired 
since 2010.  
D3 and D7 cellulosic RINs have been excluded because efforts to meet 
the cellulosic part of the RFS mandate have been challenging since inception 
of the legislation. The EPA attributes this to scarce current and expected 
production capacity, which stems from insufficient investment in 
commercial-scale refineries (Schnepf & Yacobucci, 2013). Authorized by the 
Energy Independence and Security Act, the EPA waived or proposed waiving 
large portions of the mandate from 2010 to 20135. After reducing mandated 
volumes of cellulosic biofuel, the EPA then offered credits to obligated parties 
for an announced price. The waiver credits could not be traded or banked 
and had to be used in a specific year (Schnepf & Yacobucci, 2013)6. The 
maximum amount of waiver credits available must be less than or equal to 
the mandate reduction made by the EPA. Using these waiver credits, 
obligated parties meet RVO requirements despite the production barriers for 
cellulosic biofuel. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Zero gallons of cellulosic biofuel were produced in 2010 and 2011 according to EPA EMTS 
data. 
6 The EPA offered cellulosic waiver credits at $1.56 per RIN in 2010, $1.13 in 2011, and 
$0.78 in 2012. 
18 
 
Figure 5 – Monthly RIN Generation, July 2010 to August 2013. 
 
The vast majority of RIN generation logically occurs in the biggest 
mandate category, renewable fuels, which is mainly corn-based ethanol7. 
This proportion is declining though as mandate levels of other categories 
increase. Between July 2010 and August 2013, D6 RIN generation started at 
greater than 95 percent of all RINs, but by August 2013 it only accounted for 
75 percent. Most significantly, D4 RINs have increased their share of the 
total from 4.5 percent to over 18 percent during this period. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 Equivalence Values should be acknowledged when discussing RIN generation. Specifically, 
one gallon of biodiesel is actually equal to 1.5 D6 RINs for RFS compliance. 
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Figure 6 – Total Assigned and Separated RINs Available as of 
September 10, 2013. 
 
Matching the generation numbers, Figure 6 demonstrates that D6 RINs 
still make up the large majority of credits that are currently available as of 
September, 10 2013. D6 RINs can only be used to meet one category of the 
RFS2 volume requirements and thus a large surplus has accumulated due to 
lacking demand. In total, there are over 13.2 billion D4, D5, and D6 RINs 
that have not been retired. Of these 13.2 billion RINs 76 percent are from 
2013, 18.7 percent from 2012, 2 percent from 2011, and 3.2 percent from 
20108.   
 
 
                                                          
8
 Although stocks are reported for RINs from 2010 and 2011, they are expired at this point. 
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Figure 7 – Total RINs Generated as of September 10, 2013. 
 
 
Figure 8 – Total RINs Retired as of September 10, 2013. 
 
 
Through summing the D4, D5, and D6 RINs that have been retired in 
Figure 8 it is apparent that 19.2 percent were retired in 2010, 43 percent in 
2011, 37 percent in 2011 and only 0.05 percent in 2013. The small amount 
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of retired RINs for 2013 reflects that many obligated parties or registered 
traders are holding large stocks. This is due to the fact that companies wait 
until the end of the tax year to comply with the RFS. All of these 
characteristics about the current stock of RINs allow the EPA and market 
participants to determine how much of the current mandate could potentially 
be absorbed by available RINs rather than physical blending.  
With both the RFS and regulatory aspects of RINs understood, the 
next section presents assesses previous work related to this study. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Interest in RINs has only recently increased with the previously 
mentioned price volatility and as a market that is still quite young, research 
in the area is growing. Of the work that has been done, there are a core set 
of foundational pieces that lay the theoretical framework for this project. 
Previous research has shown that RIN prices serve as an effective 
barometer for determining an implied cost of meeting the RFS mandate at a 
specific point in time (Thompson, Meyer, & Westhoff, Renewable 
Identification Number Markets: Draft Baseline Table, 2009; McPhail, 
Westcott, & Lutman, The Renewable Identification Number System and U.S. 
Biofuel Mandates, 2011; McPhail, Pricing Renewable Fuel Credits Under 
Uncertainty, 2010). Using fuel products to further define this cost, the main 
driver is the price difference between a petroleum motor fuel and the 
corresponding biofuel that would be blended. This difference between 
blending petroleum-based motor fuel and biofuel is known as the blending 
margin (Irwin, Seasonality and the Ethanol Blending Margin, 2011). When 
the net cost of blending biofuel is more expensive than the petroleum motor 
fuel (negative blending margin), firms face an economic penalty in that 
being forced to use the biofuel represents a more costly input. Alternatively, 
when the net cost of blending a biofuel is less expensive than petroleum 
motor fuel (positive blending margin), firms have an economic incentive to 
23 
 
use the biofuel regardless of the mandate. These two scenarios are referred 
to as binding and non-binding mandate environments, with binding 
representing the fact that firms must comply involuntarily, while non-binding 
meaning firms blend the maximum amount of biofuel possible even without 
the RFS (Thompson, Meyer, & Westhoff, Renewable Identification Number 
Markets: Draft Baseline Table, 2009; McPhail, Westcott, & Lutman, The 
Renewable Identification Number System and U.S. Biofuel Mandates, 2011; 
McPhail, Pricing Renewable Fuel Credits Under Uncertainty, 2010). It should 
also be noted that the mandate may be binding for one category of biofuel, 
but not necessarily another. Both conditions can be visualized through 
supply and demand models presented in Figure 9 and Figure 10. 
Figure 9 – Binding Mandate in a Biofuel Market (From Irwin and 
Good, 2013).  
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Figure 9 depicts the theoretical appearance of a binding mandate in a 
given biofuel market. In a binding scenario the equilibrium market price (P*) 
and equilibrium market quantity (Q*) are both lower than the realized price 
and quantity because the RFS pushes consumption higher to QM, which is 
the mandated level. Ps represents the price that the biofuel is supplied at, 
while Pd would be the price that buyers would be willing to pay at the 
corresponding supply level. This gap in Ps and Pd can be interpreted as the 
price of a RIN and the cost of meeting the RFS mandate (Thompson, Meyer, 
& Westhoff, Renewable Identification Number Markets: Draft Baseline Table, 
2009; McPhail, Westcott, & Lutman, The Renewable Identification Number 
System and U.S. Biofuel Mandates, 2011).  Stated another way, this wedge 
represents the price levels where an obligated party is indifferent between 
physically blending biofuels at a loss and purchasing a RIN on the secondary 
market (Irwin & Good, Is Speculation Driving Up the Price of RINs?, 2013). 
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Figure 10 – Non-Binding Mandate in a Biofuel Market (From Irwin 
and Good, 2013). 
 
In a non-binding situation, the market can achieve its equilibrium price 
(P*) and quantity (Q*). This is possible because positive blending margins 
incentivize the market to demand more of a biofuel than QM, which is the 
RFS mandated quantity of consumption. Another important feature is the 
fact that no RIN price is shown in a non-binding environment. No RIN price 
is shown because the intrinsic value component of the credit is zero 
(Thompson, Meyer, & Westhoff, Renewable Identification Number Markets: 
Draft Baseline Table, 2009). In an environment where no additional cost 
exists for complying with the mandate, obligated parties can generate 
sufficient RINs through blending the biofuel while also capturing the benefits 
of a favorable blending margin. With no demand, the RIN becomes 
intrinsically worthless, similar to a “deep out of the money” option (Johnson, 
2008). 
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 These theories have been further adapted to include a phenomenon 
known as the E10 blend wall. The blend wall influences the economics of the 
RFS mandate because it is a physical barrier to biofuel blending beyond a 
specific volume. E10 refers to 10 percent ethanol motor fuel blends. In a 
given year, approximately 10 percent of the total U.S. gasoline consumption 
can be ethanol because that is the standard blend that the national 
infrastructure and automotive fleet has been built to accommodate. As such, 
the blend wall becomes problematic when it is lower than RFS mandated 
quantities. Inaccurate forecasts for fuel consumption growth have made this 
scenario a very real possibility, as seen in 2013 (Irwin & Good, The Ethanol 
Blend Wall, Biodiesel Production Capacity, and the RFS...Something Has to 
Give, 2013; Babcock, Outlook for Ethanol and Conventional Biofuel RINs in 
2013 and 2014, 2012). In a situation where the RFS requires more biofuel to 
be blended than is physically possible, there are potentially explosive 
consequences for RIN prices as seen in Figure 11.  
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Figure 11 – Daily Current Year RIN Prices, August 28, 2009 to May 
30, 2013. 
 
The RFS mandate for renewable fuel was expected to be higher than 
the E10 blend wall in 2014. This had large implications for RIN prices during 
2013, which are visible in Figure 11. Obligated parties realized that it may 
be impossible to meet their RVO in the coming year through physical 
blending and thus switched focus to RINs (Irwin & Good, Is Speculation 
Driving Up the Price of RINs?, 2013; Babcock, Outlook for Ethanol and 
Conventional Biofuel RINs in 2013 and 2014, 2012). Being that the blend 
wall discussion originated with corn-based ethanol; D6 RINs came into focus. 
As noted previously, the EPA does have authority to waive mandates, but 
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large stocks of D6 RINs had accumulated from multiple years of non-binding 
renewable fuel mandates. This raised the possibility that perhaps the 
mandate could be met by these stocks and no EPA action would be 
necessary. 
All RIN prices converged when the blend wall emerged as a threat 
because of the nesting provision in the mandate. If D6 RIN prices exceeded 
a higher GHG reduction category, obligated parties would either opt to 
physically blend the higher category biofuel or acquire RINs of that type 
(Irwin & Good, The Ethanol Blend Wall, Biodiesel Production Capacity, and 
the RFS...Something Has to Give, 2013; Babcock, Outlook for Ethanol and 
Conventional Biofuel RINs in 2013 and 2014, 2012). This demonstrates that 
large supply and demand shifts are capable of causing major price 
movements across RIN categories. It also shows that the nesting provision 
in the RFS mandate can create price movements that are not explained by 
blending margins of one biofuel category, but rather blending margins across 
categories.  
The supply and demand dynamic is visualized in Figure 12. The only 
change from Figure 10 is the addition of QBW which represents a blend wall 
lower than the mandate. QBW is the maximum amount of biofuel that can be 
physically blended in the market, while QM is the quantity required by the 
RFS. This gap between QBW and QM must be made up by RINs, increasing 
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demand for a given RIN category and boosting prices9. The magnitude of the 
price increase is mostly dependent on the price difference between the 
higher category RIN and the RIN price of the biofuel category hit by the 
blend wall. If the price difference is large, as seen in 2013 with D6 versus D4 
RINs, the corresponding price movement of the lower category RIN during 
convergence can be immense.  
Figure 12 – Non-Binding Mandate in a Biofuel Market with Blend 
Wall. 
 
Alternatively, the use of RIN stocks would be unnecessary should the 
EPA exercise its mandate waiving power. The EPA’s ability to waive a 
mandate creates great uncertainty with RIN prices because it has the 
potential to eliminate demand. If it is expected that RINs will be needed to 
                                                          
9
 If assuming no waiver of any type from the EPA. 
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overcome a blend wall and an obligated party stockpiles RINs in preparation, 
that stockpile’s value plummets should the mandate then be reduced. This 
means that RIN owners must constantly assess the possibility of a mandate 
waiver to determine whether acquiring RINs is the best strategy (Thompson 
& Meyer, EPA Mandate Waivers Create New Uncertainties in Biodiesel 
Markets, 2011). In addition to RIN prices, the waiver provision influences 
investment in biofuel production because the threat of demand being 
removed from the market is always present (Babcock, RFS Compliance Costs 
and Incentives to Invest in Ethanol Infrastructure, 2013). 
Now that the relevant literature and theory on RINs has been 
explored, the next section takes the aforementioned models a step further, 
explaining how they can be applied to current price data which will then be 
used as the centerpiece for the econometric models. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Data 
Defining Blending Margins for Each RIN 
The central piece in characterizing a binding versus non-binding 
mandate environment as well as the intrinsic value of a RIN is the blending 
margin. Across the three major RINs that have been discussed (D4, D5, and 
D6), there are distinct margins that correspond to each RFS2 mandate 
category. Once the margins have been defined, it is theoretically possible to 
infer the intrinsic value of a RIN by comparing the margin with the RIN price. 
For D4 RINs and the biomass-based diesel section of the RFS2 
mandate, the blending margin of interest is biodiesel versus the most 
common form of petroleum diesel in the United States, Ultra-low Sulfur 
Diesel (ULSD). Although biodiesel has lower energy content than diesel, the 
added costs and benefits associated with blending biodiesel have not yet 
been quantified on a per gallon basis10; so for the purposes of this study the 
blending margin for biodiesel will be simply the gallon price of biodiesel less 
the gallon price of ULSD. Positive blending margins will be said to exist when 
the gallon price of biodiesel is less than the gallon price of ULSD and 
negative blending margins for the opposite. Figure 13 shows that blending 
margins for biodiesel have been negative (blending margin above zero) 
nearly 100 percent of the time throughout the time series. This chart 
                                                          
10
 B5 to B20 blends are estimated to have around 1 to 2 percent less fuel economy than 
solely petroleum diesel, but can also help engine operation by being a better solvent. 
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accounts for a major biodiesel producer tax credit of $1.00 over the whole 
sample. Although the credit did not exist in 2010 and 2012, it has been 
reintroduced and retroactive for the previous year in each instance. Given 
this, it is assumed that price movements reflect the expectation of a 
constant $1.00 producer credit. The mechanism to allow for the credit is a 
$1.00 reduction in the price of biodiesel, recognizing the actual market price 
is lower. 
Figure 13 – Daily U.S. Biodiesel (B100) – ULSD Blending Margin, 
August 28, 2009 to May 30, 2013. 
 
Obligated parties rationally opt for the lowest net cost biofuel when 
mandate categories allow various types of renewable fuels to satisfy the 
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volume requirement. The most applicable example of this behavior is D5 
RINs and the advanced biofuel category of the RFS. In this instance, 
obligated parties can meet their advanced biofuel requirement by blending 
imported Brazilian sugarcane ethanol, biodiesel, or cellulosic biofuel11. After 
taking the $1.00 producer tax credit, the 1.5 equivalence value that 
biodiesel gets when applied to the advanced part of the RFS mandate, and 
the opportunity cost of blending Brazilian ethanol while the E10 blend wall 
has been present, the cheapest of these three has been biodiesel, which is 
demonstrated by the price series shown in Figure 1412.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Estimated total cost of imported Brazilian ethanol = anhydrous ethanol price + estimated 
shipping cost + ad valorem tax. The shipping cost was an OPIS estimate for FOB Port of 
Santos, Brazil to the U.S. Gulf Coast. 
12
 When an E10 blend wall exists, blenders of Brazilian sugarcane ethanol forego any 
profitable margins gained by blending U.S. corn-based ethanol as it is displaced by the 
imported biofuel. The major price spike for Brazilian anhydrous ethanol was caused by tight 
supplies following the South American sugarcane harvest. 
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Figure 14 – Weekly U.S. B100 Price vs. Cost of Imported Brazilian 
Sugarcane Ethanol, January 6, 2011 to May 30, 2013.  
 
Although eligible, cellulosic biofuels are ignored as a potential 
competitor to meet the advanced biofuel mandate because such small 
production capacity exists. This is evident in EMTS data where only 236,000 
gallons of cellulosic-based fuel RINs (D3 and D7) were generated in the past 
four years. Cellulosic ethanol and cellulosic biodiesel certainly could not 
serve as the main mechanism for meeting the advanced portion of the RFS2 
mandate because those 236,000 (technically 354,000 if applied to the 
advanced biofuel mandate) are insignificant against a combined RFS2 
advanced biofuel requirement of 4.35 billion gallons through 2012 and 
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201313. The impossibility of using cellulosic biofuels to meet the advanced 
biofuel segment is further cemented by the fact that current production 
capacity is incapable of satisfying even its own mandate category and the 
EPA has been forced to distribute waivers to obligated parties in multiple 
years14. This means that no surplus of D3 or D7 RINs would be available for 
use toward other segments.   
In the recent past, U.S. biodiesel has proven to be the most cost 
efficient option for obligated parties to meet the advanced biofuel 
requirement within the RFS2 and will therefore be the assumed biofuel for 
the category’s blending margin calculation. Again, biodiesel is ultimately 
blended with petroleum-based blendstock, ULSD, before being sold to 
consumers. The blending margin remains as the price difference of biodiesel 
and ULSD. No figure is shown in this case because it is exactly the same as 
the D4 visual. 
For the D6 blending margin relationship CBOB is the petroleum motor 
fuel chosen because it is used in the majority of U.S. gasoline15. The 
assumption has been made that benefits of blending ethanol, such as octane 
enhancement, and negative factors such as lower energy content require 
ethanol to be 110 percent of the CBOB price make blenders indifferent 
                                                          
13 This is true even after taking into account the benefit of a 1.5 equivalence value that D3 
and D7 RINs get when applied to the advanced biofuel volume requirement. 
14 Total production capacity for cellulosic biofuel in 2012 was estimated at 8.65 million 
gallons. 
15 Approximately two-thirds of all finished US gasoline is CBOB-based. 
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between the two16. The accuracy of this number is not fully understood, but 
the CBOB prices have been multiplied by a factor of 1.1 to acknowledge this 
possibility. Figure 15 exhibits the blending margin between U.S. corn-based 
ethanol and CBOB17. It is clear that positive blending margins have persisted 
since mid-2009. Out of nearly one thousand observations, positive blending 
margins exist in all. 
Figure 15 – Daily U.S. Ethanol – CBOB Blending Margin, May 1, 2009 
to May 30, 2013. 
 
                                                          
16 Department of Energy Analyses in Support of the EPA Evaluation of Waivers of the 
Renewable Fuel Standard released in November 2012 claimed ethanol would need to be 
priced 10 percent higher than CBOB to make blenders indifferent. 
17 A $0.45 tax credit for U.S. corn-based ethanol was included until the end of 2011 when it 
expired. It was accounted for in the blending margin calculation by a $0.45 price reduction 
in the price of ethanol.  
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These three blending margin relationships are an essential part of the 
methods covered next. 
Blending margins determine whether a mandate is binding or non-
binding and also a RIN’s intrinsic value. This study empirically tests these 
theories by implementing one variable OLS regressions. The models regress 
each blending margin on the corresponding RIN price to quantify the 
strength of the relationship between RIN prices and blending margins. Each 
model is defined below18. 
Regression Model for D4 RINs: 
                       (              )         
Regression Model for D5 RINs: 
                       (              )         
Regression Model for D6 RINs: 
                       (                  )      
Supply and demand fundamentals of RINs imply that in a binding mandate 
environment the relationship between the blending margin and RIN price 
should be close to one. That is, for a one cent change in the blending 
margin, the RIN price would also be expected to change by one cent. Surely 
the relationships would not equal exactly one because a RIN price is not 
solely made up of the intrinsic value component. A portion of the RIN price 
                                                          
18
 In the D4 and D5 regressions the blending margin is divided by 1.5 to account for 
equivalence values in the RFS. 
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consists of the time value that a RIN possesses. Additionally, RINs that have 
longer life until expiration could be expected to have a greater time 
component and vice versa, similarly to an equity option. 
 Given the time and intrinsic components, the RIN’s total value then 
equals the sum of these parts, making the time value equal the total price 
less the intrinsic value. As options, whether the RIN is “in the money” or 
“out of the money” has large implications for the size of its time value. 
Options that are deep in the money or deep out of the money have very low 
time values, while at the money options have the largest (Johnson, 2008). If 
D4 and D5 RINs are viewed as deep in the money due to a binding mandate 
and D6 RINs are viewed as deep out of the money due to a non-binding 
mandate, then the time value component of this analysis for RIN pricing 
becomes marginal. 
The supply and demand fundamentals imply that in a non-binding 
mandate environment the relationship between the blending margin and RIN 
price should be near zero. Once again it cannot be exactly zero, due to the 
time value of a RIN. As stated before, the intrinsic value of a RIN should be 
almost zero in a non-binding environment because it is expected that RINs 
are essentially worthless. 
To create these regressions a wide array of daily spot price data has 
been aggregated using weekly issues from the Oil Price Information Service 
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(OPIS) Ethanol and Biodiesel reports. Some assumptions and adjustments 
have been made to the data to permit the analysis 
OPIS does not report a national ethanol, biodiesel, CBOB, or ULSD 
price; rather these prices are reported by region. The major regions are 
spread across the largest fuel markets of the United States: Chicago 
(Midwest), the Gulf Coast (South), New York (Northeast), and Los Angeles 
(West). The Los Angeles region does not report CBOB prices because RBOB 
is the fuel of choice at that location and has been excluded for this reason. 
With RIN prices being nationally reported, the regional data was 
averaged to allow for consistency in the regressions. For each type of 
petroleum fuel or biofuel a weighted average was calculated based on U.S. 
Energy Information Administration production reports from 2009 to 2013. As 
an example, the calculation for National CBOB price is presented19: 
 Weighted National CBOB Price = OPIS Chicago Spot Price*(EIA Midwest CBOB 
Production/National CBOB Production) + OPIS Gulf Coast Spot Price*(EIA Gulf Coast CBOB 
Production/National CBOB Production) + OPIS New York Spot Price*(EIA East Coast CBOB 
Production/National CBOB Production) 
A similar calculation was carried out for ethanol, biodiesel (B100), and Ultra-
low Sulfur Diesel. Visuals 16, 17, and 18 show the RIN price over time 
against each corresponding blending margin. 
                                                          
19 National CBOB Production was calculated as the sum of the corresponding OPIS region’s 
CBOB production. 
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Figure 16 – Daily Current D4 RIN and Blending Margin, August 28, 
2009 to May 30, 2013. 
 
In viewing Figure 16, it appears that a somewhat strong relationship 
between the D4 RIN price and the blending margin exists. Given that the 
mandate has been binding in nearly 100 percent of the sample period due to 
negative blending margins, this is an interesting starting point. 
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Figure 17 – Daily Current D5 RIN and Blending Margin, January 3, 
2011 to May 30, 2013. 
 
Figure 17 does not demonstrate as strong of a relationship between the D5 
RIN price and the blending margin as was seen with the D4 RIN. Although 
this is true, the visual does make the case for further inquiry. 
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Figure 18 – Daily Current D6 RIN and Blending Margin, May 1, 2009 
to May 30, 2013. 
 
Figure 18 portrays no obvious pattern between the D6 RIN price and the 
blending margin. This is a notable because blending margins have been 
positive for 100 percent of the sample period.  
From these visuals it is clear that two, vastly different market scenarios 
persist among the RIN types.  
o D4 & D5 RINs represent markets with a binding mandate and negative 
blending margins for nearly 100 percent of the sample period.  
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o D6 RINs portray a market that has had positive blending margins and 
a non-binding mandate for 100 percent of sample period.  
Although insightful, these visuals do not accurately define and quantify the 
relationship as needed. Results from the following regressions complete the 
investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Chapter 5: Results and Conclusion 
Results 
From the models, three OLS regressions were run and reported below, 
along with scatter plots. Detailed regression results are located in Appendix 
Tables 3, 4 and 5. 
Figure 19 – D4 RIN Regression Results, August 28, 2009 to May 30, 
2013. 
 
According to regression results for the D4 RIN, 66.83 percent of the 
variation in RIN price is explained by the model. Interpreting the slope 
coefficient communicates that a $1.00 increase in the margin would be 
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estimated to increase D4 RIN prices by $1.1787.  Standard error associated 
with estimating the slope coefficient was 0.028.  
Figure 20 – D5 RIN Regression Results, January 3, 2011 to May 30, 
2013. 
 
As the theory would dictate, results from the D5 RIN regression show 
a moderately weaker relationship for RIN price and the blending margin. 
47.87 percent of the variation in D5 RIN price is explained by the model. A 
slope coefficient of 0.419 implies that a $1.00 increase in the margin would 
be expected to increase D5 RIN prices by $0.419. Standard error associated 
with estimating the slope coefficient was 0.12. 
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Figure 21 – D6 RIN Regression Results, May 1, 2009 to May 30, 
2013. 
 
The results for the D6 RIN test demonstrate an extremely weak 
relationship between RIN prices and the blending margin. The model 
explains approximately 7.82% of the variation in D6 RIN prices20. A slope 
coefficient of 0.1807 implies that a $1.00 increase in the margin would be 
                                                          
20
 The odd price behavior where D6 RINs exceeded approximately $0.20 in Figure 22 
occurred exclusively in 2013. Appendix Figures 1 and 2 show that D6 RIN price was more a 
factor of the D4 blending margin than the D6 blending margin during this period.  83.69 
percent of the movement in D6 RIN price can be explained by the biodiesel blending margin 
model, while only 29.19 percent can be explained by the ethanol blending margin model. 
The ethanol model also violates the basic premise that blending margins must be negative 
to generate intrinsic RIN values above zero. These findings support explanations behind RIN 
price synchronization explored in Chapter 3.  
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expected to increase D6 RIN prices by $0.1807. Standard error associated 
with estimating the slope coefficient was 0.020. 
Next follows an interpretation of the results, which evaluates the 
empirical tests against theoretical expectations. 
Conclusion 
Before implementing the regressions, there were two major 
expectations for the model outputs predicated on the presented price data. 
Here it was evident that D4 and D5 RINs have existed under different 
market conditions than D6 RINs, which leads to the expectation that the 
strength of the relationship with the underlying blending margin would vary. 
To recap these conditions: 
o Blending margins have been negative for biodiesel making that 
mandate binding for both D4 and D5 RINs nearly 100 percent of the 
time. 
o Corn-based ethanol blending margins have been positive creating a 
non-binding mandate for 100 percent of the period. 
With these scenarios clearly laid out, some basic hypotheses were made. D4 
RINs should demonstrate the strongest relationship with the underlying 
blending margin, then D5 RINs, and lastly D6 RINs. D6 RINs were expected 
to have almost no relationship with the underlying blending margin because 
of the non-binding mandate. D5 RINs were expected to have a much 
stronger relationship than D6, but still lagging behind results from the D4 
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RINs. The D5 relationship was expected to be weaker than D4 mostly 
because despite the price analysis, biodiesel may not have always been used 
to generate D5 RINs, consequently creating less of a relationship. 
If one was to compare these hypotheses against the results, it appears 
that they hold up when tested. This has positive implications for previous 
work on RINs in that it validates the theory that cited studies have 
communicated. The analysis concludes that blending margins are a solid 
indicator for determining whether a mandate is binding or non-binding in a 
given RFS2 biofuel category, in addition to providing a baseline estimate for 
the intrinsic value component of a RIN when the mandate is binding. In a 
binding mandate scenario, the D4 regression analysis suggests that close to 
70 percent of the price movement in a RIN can be linked to the blending 
margin. When the mandate is non-binding, predicting the price of a RIN can 
be much more difficult because it only consists of time value.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion  
Through standard one variable OLS regressions a baseline model for 
understanding RIN price movements has been shown. It is intended that 
these results would serve as a foundation for more sophisticated models in 
the future pricing of RINs. Using a forecast for a blending margin, this study 
suggests that a great amount of information regarding future RIN price can 
be extrapolated. Positive blending margins signal extremely low RIN prices, 
while negative margins open the door to forecasting the intrinsic value 
component of a RIN. With this component possibly motivating near 70 
percent of the price movements for a binding mandate RIN, accuracy 
ultimately depends on the precision of blending margin forecasts. 
The study certainly has limitations in multiple areas. To start, tax 
credits for biodiesel production have had a major influence on the blending 
margin for this RFS2 category. Reducing the price of biodiesel by $1.00 to 
capture all blending margin influence of the credit may be a drastic 
oversimplification.  It is likely that market participants already take 
expectations of a tax credit or retroactive tax credit into account and by 
introducing an adjustment, the impact of the tax credit could be effectively 
counted twice (Irwin, The Remarkable Foresight of Biodiesel RINs Traders, 
2013). Also, large price adjustments in response to expectations of a tax 
credit could affect the blending margin and RIN value long before the day 
that the calculation involving the $1.00 reduction in biodiesel price would 
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have taken place. Overall, there may be a better approach to handling the 
tax credit’s effect on the blending margin than subtracting a flat $1.00 from 
the biodiesel price across the time series. 
Another limitation is the assumption that a blending margin becomes 
negative or positive for all blenders at certain price levels, when this is a 
great generalization. Some firms can blend biofuels more competitively than 
others due to logistical advantages which influences when a blending margin 
becomes positive or negative. A group of blenders may reach positive 
margins where others do not and vice versa.  
The importance of RINs as they relate to global biofuel markets will 
only increase as the RFS2 mandates grow over the next ten years. With the 
significance of the blending margin quantified across various RIN categories, 
more advanced pricing models should be possible, aiding efforts to manage 
risk, forecast prices and trade this new market. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 3 – D4 RIN Regression Results. 
 
Table 4 – D5 RIN Regression Results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.818
R Square 0.668
Adjusted R Square 0.668
Standard Error 0.285
Observations 910.000
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1.000 148.438 148.438 1829.501 0.000
Residual 908.000 73.671 0.081
Total 909.000 222.109
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.355 0.015 23.940 0.000 0.326 0.384 0.326 0.384
B100 - ULSD Margin 1.179 0.028 42.773 0.000 1.125 1.233 1.125 1.233
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.692
R Square 0.479
Adjusted R Square 0.478
Standard Error 0.142
Observations 600.000
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1.000 11.087 11.087 549.028 0.000
Residual 598.000 12.076 0.020
Total 599.000 23.163
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.452 0.012 38.769 0.000 0.429 0.475 0.429 0.475
B100 - ULSD Margin 0.279 0.012 23.431 0.000 0.256 0.303 0.256 0.303
54 
 
Table 5 – D6 RIN Regression Results. 
 
Figure 22 – D6 RIN Price Regression Using Ethanol Blending Margin, 
January 2, 2013 to May 30, 2013 
 
 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.280
R Square 0.078
Adjusted R Square 0.077
Standard Error 0.178
Observations 993.000
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1.000 2.659 2.659 84.090 0.000
Residual 991.000 31.338 0.032
Total 992.000 33.997
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.245 0.017 14.242 0.000 0.212 0.279 0.212 0.279
Ethanol - CBOB Margin 0.181 0.020 9.170 0.000 0.142 0.219 0.142 0.219
y = 0.9904x + 0.8987
R² = 0.2919
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Table 6 – D6 RIN Price Regression Using Biodiesel Blending Margin 
Results, January 2, 2013 to May 30, 2013 
 
 
Figure 23 – D6 RIN Price Regression Using Biodiesel Blending 
Margin, January 2, 2013 to May 30, 2013 
 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.540
R Square 0.292
Adjusted R Square 0.285
Standard Error 0.242
Observations 103
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 2.437 2.437 41.636 0.000
Residual 101 5.913 0.059
Total 102 8.350
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.899 0.058 15.535 0.000 0.784 1.013 0.784 1.013
Ethanol - CBOB 0.990 0.153 6.453 0.000 0.686 1.295 0.686 1.295
y = 1.031x - 1.1441
R² = 0.8369
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Table 7 – D6 RIN Price Regression Using Biodiesel Blending Margin 
Results, January 2, 2013 to May 30, 2013 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.915
R Square 0.837
Adjusted R Square 0.835
Standard Error 0.116
Observations 103
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 6.988 6.988 518.201 0.000
Residual 101 1.362 0.013
Total 102 8.350
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -1.144 0.076 -15.120 0.000 -1.294 -0.994 -1.294 -0.994
B100 - ULSD 1.031 0.045 22.764 0.000 0.941 1.121 0.941 1.121
